THE PEOPLE vs. KELLEY.

In the

ew York Court of Appeals.

THE PEOPLE, eX rel. HACKLEY, VS. KELLY, ETC.,
AND MATTER OF ANDREW J. HACKLEY.
The Constitution (Art. 1,

6,) does not protect a witness in a criminal prosecution

against another, from being compelled to give testimony which implicates him
in a crime, when he has been protected by statute against the use of such
testimony on his own trial.
That the information thus elicited facilitates the discovery of other evidence by
which the witness may be subsequently convicted, is an incidental consequence
against which the Constitution does not guard him. Its prohibition is simply
against his being required to give evidence where he himself is upon trial.
The refusal of a witness to answer a proper question before a grand jury, is
punishable as a contempt under the statute (2 R. S., p. 634, 1, p: 785, 14),
as committed in a proceeding upon an indictment.
When the refusal was reported by the grand jury to the court in the presence of
the witness, who did not deny but justified the same, and reiterated the refusal,
the contemyt is one "in the immediate view and presence of the court," and no
affidavit or further evidence is requisite to a commitment.
The appellate court, before which the propriety of a commitment for contempt is
brought by certiorari, or even collaterally on habews carpu, is bound to discharge
the prisoner where the act charged as criminal is necessarily innocent or
justifiable, or where it is the mere assertion of a constitutional right.
The adjudication of the court in which the alleged contempt occurred, while
conclusive that the party committed the act whereof he was convicted, and of
its character when that might, according to the circumstances, be meritorious
or criminal, cannot establish as a contempt that which the law entitled the
party to do.

The first of these cases is an appeal from a judgment of the*
Supreme Court, by which Hackley, the relator, was remanded to
the custody of the sheriff, after a hearing of his case upon a return
to a writ of habeas corpus, issued at his instance to the said
sheriff. The other is an appeal from the judgment of the same
'court, dismissing a certiorariwhich Hackley had procured to be
issued to the Court of General Sessions of the city and county of
New York, to review an order of that court, adjudging him guilty
of a criminal contempt, and to be imprisoned there for the term
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of thirty days; from which imprisonment it was also the purpose
of the habeas corpus to relieve him. The object of the proceeding
in both cases was to determine the legality of the conviction of
Hackley for a contempt.
The record of the Court of Sessions, set out in the return to the
habeas corpus and in the return to the certiorari,was as follows :
At a court of general sessions of the peace, holden in and for the
city and county of New York, &c., April 81, 1861. Present,
Join T. HoFFmAN, Recorder. In the matter of Andrew J.
Hackley.
The grand jury, heretofore in due form selected drawn, summoned, and sworn to serve as grand jurors, to serve in the court
of general sessions of the peace, in and for the city and county
of New York, come into court and make complaint by and through
their foreman, theretofore duly appointed and sworn, that Andrew
J. ilackley, after being duly summoned and sworn, as prescribed
by law, as a witness in a certain matter and complaint pending
before such grand jury, whereof they had cognisance against
certain aldermen and members of the common council of the city
of New York, for feloniously receiving a gift of money, under an
agreement that their votes should be influenced thereby in a
matter then pending before said aldermen and members of the
common council in their official capacity, did then and there
refuse to answer the following legal and proper interrogatory,
propounded to him, the said Andrew J. Hackley, to wit: -What
did you do with the pile of bills received from Thomas Hope, and
which he told you amounted to fifty thousand dollars?" And the
said Andrew J. Hackley then and there, instead of answering the
said interrogatory, stated as follows, to wit : "Any answer which
I could give to that question would disgrace me, and would have a
tendency to accuse me of a crime. I therefore demur to the
question, referring to the ancient common law rule, that no man
is held to accuse himself, and to the sixth section of the first
article of the constitution of this state." And the court having
then and there decided that the said interrogatory is a legal and
proper one, and that the reasons given by the said Andrew J.
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Hackley for not answering the same are invalid and insufficient;
and now ordering the said Andrew J. Hackley to answer the said
interrogatory, and he, the said Andrew J. Hackley, still contumaciously and unlawfully refusing to answer the said interrogatory,
the court doth hereby adjudge the said Andrew J. Hackley, by
reason of the premises aforesaid, guilty of a criminal contempt of
court; and doth further order and adjudge the said Andrew J.
:ackley, for the criminal contempt aforesaid, whereof he is
convicted, be imprisoned in the jail of the county for the term
of thirty days.
Hackley appealed from the judgment of the Supreme Court in
both cases.
James T. Brady and Amasa J. Parker,for the appellant, maintained that the provision in the constitution, which declares that
no person " shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself," should not be limited to testimony in criminal
prosecutions against the party, but that, by a proper and necessary
construction, it should be held to protect every person from being
required to give testimony in any case, the tendency of which would
be to accuse him of a crime; and, if the rule could be affected by
legislation, that it was not enough that he should be guarded
against having his testimony given in evidence, as his admission,
in a prosecution which might be afterwards brought against him,
as was done by the statute relied on, but that he should be wholly
protected against any prosecution for the offence ; inasmuch as his
testimony might disclose facts and circumstances which, being
thus ascertained, might be proved against him by testimony other
than his sworn admission. They also insisted that the commitment
was void on its face, because the Revised Statutes did not make a
refusal to testify before a grand jury a contempt; and, also, that
the commitment did not show that his misconduct was committed
in the immediate view and presence of the court, or that the facts
were proved by affidavit served on the accused, with a reasonable
time given him to make his defence.
J. H. Anthon, for the respondent, besides controverting those
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positions, argued that the propriety of the commitment could not
be examined upon the return to a writ of habeas corpus.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DErTio, J.-As a general rule, the propriety of a commitment
for contempt is not examinable in any other court than the one by
which it was awarded. This is especially true where the proceeding by which it is sought to be questioned is a writ of habeas
corpus; as the question on the validity of the judgment then
arises collaterally, and not by the way of review; and the habeas
corpus act, moreover, declares that where the detention of the
party seeking to be discharged by habeas corpus appears to be for
any contempt, plainly and specially charged in the commitment,
ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction, he shall be remanded
to the custody in which he was found. But this rule is of course
subject to the qualification, that the conduct charged as constituting the contempt must be such, that some degree of delinquency
or misbehavior can be predicated of it ; for if the act be plainly
indifferent or meritorious, or if it be only the assertion of the
undoubted right of the party, it will not become a criminal
contempt by being adjudged to be so. The question whether the
alleged offender really committed the act charged, will be conelusively determined by the order or judgment of the court; and
so with equivocal acts, which may be culpable or innocent according to the circumstances ; but where the act is necessarily innocent or justifiable, it would be preposterous to hold it a cause of
imprisonment. Hence, if the refusal of Mr. Hackley the relator,
to answer the question propounded to him, was only an assertion
of a right secured to every person by the constitution, it was
illegal to commit him for a contempt; and this error was certainly
reached by the certiorari,if not examinable on the return to the
habeas corpus.
On the other hand, if the case was such that he was obliged, by
law, to answer the inquiry, the power of the court to punish him
for his refusal was undoubted. If the case is not reached by the
statute, the power would be ample at the common law. But I am
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of the opinion that the statute applies to the refusal of a witness
to answer a legal question put to him by the grand jury, to the
same extent as though he were called to give testimony on the
trial of an issue before the court or a petit jury. The act declares
that courts of record have power to punish by fine and imprisonment any misconduct by persons summoned as witnesses, for
refusing to be sworn or to answer as such witnesses: 2 R. S.,
p. 534, § 1, subd. 5. But the title of the Revised Statutes in
which this is found relates primarily to proceedings in civil cases.
By another provision, however, the enactment just mentioned,
together with several other directions relating to trials in civil
cases, are declared to extend to trials and other proceedings on
indictments, so far as they may be in their nature applicable
thereto: 2 R. S., p. 738, § 14. The criticism of the appellant's
counsel is, that the examination of a witness before a grand jury
is not a proceeding upon an indictment, and so not within the
statute. In one sense it is not. But by the theory of proceedings in criminal cases, the indictment is suffered to be prepared
and taken before the grand jury by the counsel prosecuting for
the state ; and the evidence is then given in respect to the offence
charged in it. If the party accused appears to be guilty, the
indictment is certified to be a true bill: otherwise, it is thrown
out. In that view of the practice, all which takes place before
the grand jury, as well as the subsequent steps, may be said to be
proceedings upon the indictment.
It is further urged on the part of the relator, that the conviction
is erroneous because it does not appear that the contempt was
committed in the presence of the court, and that there was no
proof by affidavit, as required by the statute: 2 R. S., p. 535,
§§ 2, 3. It appears by the record returned, that -the relator and
the grand jury being present in open court, it was stated on the
part of the jury that the relator had declined to answer the inquiry
touching the disposition of certain moneys which had come to his
hands, basing his refusal upon the constitutional provision. The
question being thus presented for the determination of the Court
of Sessions, it held that the constitutional provision did not apply,
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and the relator was thereupon directed to answer the interrogatory
as required by the grand jury. It is not to be understood that
the order was to proceed with the examination on the spot. What
was said was for the purpose of settling the rights and duties of
the witness and of the jury, when they should be again convened
in the grand jury room. The witness might hav6 postponed his
election whether he would obey or not, until the examination
before the jury was resumed ; but he chose, as was doubtless the
most convenient course, to declare his deternfination at once. He
thereby waived the formality of having the question repeated in
the jury room, and the court was at liberty to act, as it did, upon
that waiver. The refusal of the prisoner to give testimony in
answer to the contested question was made in the face of the court.
If such refusal was a contempt, such contempt was committed " in
the immediate view and presence of the court;" and it was authorized by the statute to act without further evidence.
But if it were necessary to proceed under the other branch of
the statute, and to prove to the court the transaction before the
grand jury, the conviction would not be even erroneous. The
relator and the jury being present, the latter reported the particulars of the controversy of the relator, including his reasons for
refusing to answer. It does not appear that it was claimed by
him, or that he asked for time to refute what was alleged against
him. On the contrary, when informed that it was his duty to
answer, he, as the record states, still refused to answer. The
whole of these proceedings assume that the statement of the jury
was conceded by all the witnesses to be a correct account of what
had transpired up to that time. The appearance of the relator
before the court must have been gratuitous; for there is no statement that any notice had been given or any process issued. His
voluntary appearance and his persistence in the course which it
was alleged lie had taken before the grand jury, was an implied
admission of the facts, and a waiver of further time to defend
himself. It is apparent that the question was presented in a
manner somewhat informal, but which was assented to by the
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parties, in order to have a prompt determination of the constitu
tional question involved.
There seems, therefore, to be nothing to preclude us from
examining the main question, whether the relator could lawfully
refuse to answer the interrogatory put to him.
The bribery *act of 1853, declares the giving to or receiving
money, &c., by any or divers public officers named, including any
member of the common council of a city, with a view to influence
their action, upon any matter which may come officially before
them, an offence punishable by fine and imprisonment in a state
prison. For the purpose of enabling the public to avail itself of
the testimony of a participator in the offence, the fourteenth
3ection provides as follows: "Every person offending against
aither of the preceding sections of this article shall be a competent
witness against any other person so offending, and may be compelled to appear and give evidence before any magistrate or grand
jury, or in any court in the same manner as other persons ; but
the testimony so given shall not be used in any prosecution or
proceeding, civil or criminal, against the person so testifying :"
Ch. 539. A similar provision is found in an act to amend the
charter of the city of New York, passed in 1857. The fifty-second
section relates to bribes of the members of the common council
and the officers of the corporation ; making the giving and the
receiving of bribes highly criminal, and concluding with an enactment substantially similar to the fourteenth section of the act of
1853. The design was to enable either party concerned in the
commission of an offence against the act, to be examined as a
witness by the grand jury or public officer intrusted with the
prosecution. The question to be determined, is whether these
provisions are consistent with the true sense of the constitutional
declaration, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself: Art. 1, § 6.
The primary and most oBvious sense of the mandate is that a
person prosecuted for a crime shall not be compelled to give
evidence on behalf of the prosecution against himself in that case.
It is argued, that no such narrow and verbal construction could
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have been in the view of the authors of the article, for the
reason that no such atrocious proceeding as that supposed has
been tolerated in civilized countries in modern times. But constitutional provisions are not levelled solely at the evils most
current at the times in which they are adopted, but while embracing these, they look to the history of the abuses of political
society in times past, and in other countries; and endeavor to
form a system which shall protect the members of the state against
those acts of oppression and misgovernment which unrestrained
political or judicial power are always and everywhere most apt to
fall into: See observations of Chief Justice SPENCER on this
subject, reported in 18 John. 202. The history of England in
early periods, furnishes abundant instances of unquestionable and
cruel methods of extorting confessions; and the practice at this
day in the criminal tribunals of the most polished countries in
continental Europe, is to subject an accused person to a course of
interrogatories which would be quite revolting to a mind accustomed only to the more humane system of English and American
criminal law. It was not, therefore, unreasonable to guard by
constitutional sanctions against a repetition of such practices in
this state; and it is not at all improbable that the true sense of
the provision in question corresponds with the natural construction
of the language. But there is great force in the argument that
constitutional provisions, devised against governmental oppressions,
and especially against such as may be exercised under pretence
of judicial power, ought to be construed with the utmost liberality,
and to be extended so as to accomplish the full object which the
author apparently had in view, so far as it can be done consistently with any fair interpretation of the language employed. The
mandate that an accused person should not be compelled to give
evidence against himself, would fail to secure the whole object
intended, if a prosecutor might call an accomplice or confederate
in a criminal offence and afterwards use the evidence he might
give, to procure a conviction on the trial of an indictment against
him. If obliged to testify on the trial of the co-offender to matters
which would show his own complicity, it might be said upon a very
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liberal construction of the language that he was compelled to give
evidence against himself, that is, to give evidence which might be
used in a criminal case against himself. It is perfectly well settled
that where there is no legal provision to protect the witness
against the reading of the testimony on his own trial, he cannot
be compelled to 'answer: The People. vs. Mather, 4 Wend. 229,
and cases there referred to. This course of adjudication does not
result from any judicial construction of the constitution, but is a
branch of the common law doctrine which excuses a person from
giving testimony which will tend to disgrace him, to charge him
with a penalty or forfeiture, or to convict him of a crime. It is
of course competent for the legislature to change any doctrine of
the common law, but I think they could not compel a witness to
testify on the trial of another person to facts which would prove
himself guilty of a crime without indemnifying him against the
consequences, because I think, as has been mentioned, that by a
legal construction, the constitution would be found to forbid it.
But it is proposed by the appellant's counsel to push the construction of the constitution a step further. A person is not only
not compellable to be a witness against himself in his own cause,
or to testify to the truth in a prosecution against another person
where the evidence given, if used as his admission, might lead to
convict himself if he should be afterwards prosecuted, but he is
still privileged from answering, though he is secured against his
answers being repeated to his prejudice on another trial against
himself. It is no doubt true that a precise account of the circumstances of a given crime would afford a prosecutor some facilities
for fastening the guilt upon the actual offender, though he were
not permitted to prove such account upon the trial. The possession of the circumstances might point out to him sources of
evidence which he would otherwise be ignorant of; and in this way
the witness might be prejudiced. But neither the law nor the
constitution is so sedulous to screen the guilty as the argument
supposes. If a man cannot give evidence upon the trial of another
person without disclosing circumstances which will make his own
guilt apparent or at least capable of proof, though his account of
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the transactions should never be used as evidence, it is the misfortune of his condition and not any want of humanity in the law.
If a witness objects to a question on the ground that an answer
would criminate himself, he must allege, in substance, that his
answer, if repeated as his admission on his own trial, would tend to
prove him guilty of a criminal offence. If the case is so situated
that a repetition of it on a prosecution against him is impossible, as
where it is forbidden by a positive statute, I have seen no authority
which holds or intimates that the witness is privileged. It is not
within any reasonable construction of the language of the constitutional provision. The term criminal case, used in the clause, must
be allowed some meaning, and none can be conceived other than a
prosecution for a criminal offence. But it must be a prosecution
against him, for what is forbidden is that he should be compelled
to be a witness against himself. Now if he be prosecuted criminally touching the matter about which he has testified upon the
trial of another person, the statute makes it impossible that his
testimony given on that occasion should be used by the prosecution
on the trial. It cannot, therefore, be said that in such criminal
case he has been made a witness against himself, by force of any
compulsion used towards him to procure his testimony in the other
case, which testimony cannot possibly be used in the criminal case
against himself.
I conclude, therefore, that the relator was not protected by the
constitution from answering before the grand jury.
A similar question has been before the former Court of Chancery and the late Court of Errors. By the usury act of 1837, it
was made a criminal offence to take usurious interest, and, by a
provision of the same act, a plaintiff, in an action at law, brought
on a contract alleged to be usurious, might be examined by the
defendant as a witness to prove the usury, and the alleged usurer
was likewise obliged to answer a bill of discovery on oath; but it
was provided that neither the testimony so given, nor the sworn
answer of the defendant in Chancery, should be used against the
party.who had so testified or answered, either before the grand
jury, or on the trial of an indictment: Ch. 430. In Perine vs.
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Pixley, 7 Paige 598, the defendant had demurred to the plaintiff's bill, which was filed to enforce proceedings at law on a note
alleged to be usurious, and which required a discovery of the usury
by the defendant's oath. The Chancellor considered the statutory
pro.vision, that the answer should not be used against the party,
before the grand jury or on the trial of an indictment against him,
as an answer to the objection taken on the ground now under
consideration ; but the case was decided against the plaintiff on
another ground. The case of Henry vs. The Bank of Salina, 5
Hill 523, S. C., in the Supreme Court, Id. 555, approaches very
near to a judgment of the court of errors upon the precise point.
On the trial, the defendant had offered to call the real plaintiff to
prove the usury, in an action at law, pursuant to the act of 1837;
though the plaintiff on the record was another person who had no
interest in the demand. The main question was whether one for
whose benefit the action was brought, but who was not the plaintiff
on the record, was within the scope of the statute. The Supreme
Court held he was not ; and hence, that not having the protection
of the statute, he could not be compelled to prove himself guilty
of a misdemeanor. The judgment, which was for the plaintiff, was
reversed in the court of errors; where it was filed that a plaintiff
in interest was within the statute, and that the Supreme Court bad
committed an error in not compelling the plaintiff to be sworn.
Such a decision, of course, assumed that the statute requiring the
plaintiff to be sworn, was constitutional on the ground that it
afforded a sufficient protection to the plaintiff, who was thus compelled to be a witness. This would be entirely conclusive upon the
point now under discussion, but for the fact first mentioned by the
Chancellor, that the case did not disclose whether the usury, on
account of which the defendant sought to avoid the note, had been
actually taken, or only secured to be taken. If the latter was the
case, he held that the usurer would not be indictable, as the
section of the statute, creating the criminal offence, applied only
to those who actually received the usurious premium. No protection would be required in such a case; at all events, the constitution would not stand in the way. But the learned Chancellor
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added: ",In the case now under consideration, I think the witness
was compelled to testify, he being the real plaintiff, even if he had
received a portion of the usurious premium so as to subject him to
indictment under the act of 1837. And provided he was not the
real plaintiff, but a mere witness, he was bound to testify if he had
made a usurious contract merely, without having actually received
the usurious premium." None of the other members, of the court
spoke particularly of the point now in question ; but the case, if
not a precise authority, shows at least considerable weight of
judicial opinion in favor of the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the present case.
My conclusion is, that both the judgments appealed from ought
to be affirmed.
I. The early authorities are opposed
to the view, that the propriety of a commitment for contempt, can be examined
upon the return to a writ of habeas
corpus. The course of reasoning was
that an adjudication, that a contempt
has been committed, is a conviction, and
the commitment in consequence an execution, and no court can discharge or
bail a person, that is in execution by
the judgment of any other court: Brass
Crosby's Case, 3 Wilson 183, 199. The
principal opinion was delivered by Lord
Chief Justice Dn GREY. This doctrine
was adopted in Ex parte Kearny, 7
Wheaton 43, by the Supreme Court of
the United States. The court held, as
no appellate power in criminal cases
had been confided to it by the laws of
the United States, and as it cannot
revise the judgments of the circuit court
by writ of error, in any case where a
party has been convicted of a public
offence, that it would not indirectly
review the decision by habeas corpus.
The prisoner had been convicted of q,
contempt, for refusing to answer a question which was put to him, because he
conceived it. tended materially to implicate him and to criminate him a: a
VOL. 10.-35

particeps criminis. The court did not
take the distinction made in the principal case, but held, that as it could not
on a judgment obtained on an indictment revise it on habeas corpus, so it
could not on a conviction for contempt,
which was equivalent to a judgment.
This case was followed in Jordan vs.
State, 14 Texas 436. So in Passmore
Williamson's Case, 26 Penn. (2 Casey) 9,
it was held, that a judgment pronounced
in the District Court of the United States
against a person for contempt, in disobeying its process, is conclusive, and
cannot be examined in a state court on
habeas corpus. Said the court, "All
courts have the power to punish for
contempt and must necessarily have it.
The authority to deal with an offender
of this class, belongs exclusively to the
court in which the offence is committed,
and no other court, not even the highest,
can interfere with its exercise, either by
writ of error, mandamus, or habeas
corpus. If the power be abused, there
is no remedy but by impeachment.
* *
*
If we fully believed the petitioner to be innocent, if we were sure
that the court which convicted him.
misunderstood the facts or misapplied
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the law, still we could not re-examine
the evidence or rejudge the justice of
the case." This language is undoubtedly very strong, but the only point
really decided in these cases was, that
where there was no right of appeal under
ordinary methods, the court or a judge
on a habeas corpus, would not do indirectly what could not be done directly.
The first case cited was a conviction by
the House of Commons; the second, by
a United States court without any appeal; the third, by a United States
court, and the authority of a state court
was invoked.
The principle on which these decisions
are based, does not appear to embrace
such cases as that of People vs. Kelly.
A direct method of review in the Supreme Court, is provided by the legislation of New York, of all judgments of
the court of general sessions based upon
an indictment, and if there could have
been no review of a conviction for a
contempt, a defect of justice would have
existed. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have recently explained Passmore Williamson's Case, supra, and have
confined its effect to the class of cases
above indicated: Commonwealth vs.
Newton, 1 Grant's Cases (Penn.) 453,
(1857). 'It was there held, that the
course of proceedings by which a superior state tribunal reviewed the decisions
of an inferior state court, was not analogous to that, where an attempt was
made to review the decision of a United
States court in a state court. In that
case, the conviction for contempt was
reviewed on an appeal as the result of a
proper construction of a state statute.
It would seem in accordance with principle in all such cases, as that discussed
in Commonwealth vs. Newton, and in
People vs. Kelly, that the propriety of a
conviction for contempt should be subject to review on habeas corpus, when
no other distinct method is provided.

See Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 17.5, also
Mr. Holroyd's argument in the case of
Burdett vs. Abbott, 14 East 69, 70,
apparently approved by Lord ELLENBOROUG in the same case, p. 150.

However this may be, even if we
assume that the principle of Brass Crosby's Case should be applied to both
classes of cases, where adjudications for
contempt have been made, it should be
extended only to those instances where
the commitment is for contempt generally. If the ground on which the adjudication was made, appeared upon the
face of the return, and this was palpably
bad, the prisoner ought to be discharged.
By parity of reasoning, the court on
habeas corpus should have a right to
examine the return, to ascertain if.it
were wholly insufficient. In the strong
language of Lord ELENBOROUGH, "if a

commitment appeared to be for a contempt generally, I would neither in the
case of the House of Commons or of any
other of the superior courts inquire
further; but if it did not profess to
commit for a contempt, but for some
matter appearing on the return, which
could by no reasonable intendment be
oonsidered as a contempt of the court
committing, but a ground of commitmpnt palpably and evidently arbitrary,
unjust and contrary to every principle
of positive law or national justice, we
must look and act upon it as justice may
require, from whatever court it may
profess to have proceeded." And again,
"if the judges before whom those applications (Brass Crosby's, &c.,) were made,
on writs of habeas corpus, had felt, that
the Houses had no pretence of power to
commit, or had seen upon the face of
the returns that they had exercised it in
those cases extravagantly and beyond all
bounds of-reason and law, would they not
have been wanting in their duty if they
had not looked into the causes of con-
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mitment stated ?" Burdett r. Abbott, 14
East 150-1.
In the case of Ex parte Rowe, 7 California R. 175, 181, 184, (1857,) the same
point was presented as in the principal
case. A witness had refused to testify
because an answer to the question asked
would tend to criminate him, and had
been convicted of a contempt. It was
held on habeas corpus, that the rule in
Brass Crossby's Case extends only to
lawful orders, and, if the prisoner was
protected by a constitutional provision
he ought to be discharged: see Burnham
v. Morrissey, 14 Gray (Mass.) 226, where
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
would appear to be of the same opihion,
in the case of a commitment by the
House of Representatives. The power
of the House in that state is to a certain
extent regulated by the constitution,
but the court did not proceed upon that
ground. Morrissey was the sergeant-at-
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arms of the House, and an action had
been brought against him by Burnham
for false imprisonment. He justified
under his warrant from the speaker.
The court inquired into the grounds on
which the commitment rested, as they
would have done if an application had
been made for a discharge on habeas
corpus. See also Hurd on Habeas Corpus
411-13, and authorities cited.
II. The principal question discussed
in this case, involving the proper construction of the constitutional provision,
that a person shall not be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, was presented to the Supreme
Court of California in Ex parte Rowe,
7 Cal. 181, 184, (1857,) and the same
conclusion in substance was reached.
The witness in that case also, had been
protected by statute against the use of
his testimony on his own trial.
T. W. D.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
WILHELMINE REICHARD,

Respondent, vs. THE

INSURANCE COMPANY,

MANHATTAN

LIFE

Appellant.

1. As a general rule, the party holding the affirmative of the issues has the right
to open and conclude the argument to the jury; but such practice being within
the discretion of the court, 'the refusal to give the defendant the conclusion will
be no cause for reversal of the judgment.
2. An agreement in a policy of insprance, executed by a foreign insurance
company, that the insured waives the right to bring an action upon the policy
except in the courts of the state incorporating such company, is void, both as
against public policy and the statute of this state relating to foreign insurance
companies of December 8, 1855; R. C., p. 884.
8. Where, in a policy of insurance upon life, the representation was made that
the insured was sober and temperate and in good health; if the representation
was true at the time it was made, the subsequent habits of the insured would
be no bar to a recovery upon the policy.
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APPEAL

from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Suit upon a life policy

of insurance made by the defendant, a company chartered by the
state of New York, and dated July 1, 1856, upon an application
dated June 16, 1856. To the question, " Is the party sober and
Q. ,What is the
temperate ?" the applicant answered, "Yes."
present state of health of the party ?" Ans. ,Very good."
Q.
"Does the applicant know that any misstatement would render
the policy void ?" Ans. ,Yes."
The application had the following provision: cI hereby expressly waive all right to bring any action for any claim whatever
arising under any policy issued to me on this application and
declaration except in the courts of New York."
The policy having been forfeited by non-payment of the premium, was renewed July 16, 1857.
The instructions appear in the opinion. The verdict was for
the plaintiff.
Knox and Kellogg, for appellant.
1. The appellant insists that the respondent, before the issuing
of the policy sued on, waived all right to sue except in the courts
of the state of New York, and that the Court erred in refusing
the instruction asked to that effect.
2. The Court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, that if
ReicharAd's death was occasioned by the intemperate and excessive
use of intoxicating drinks, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
Hartand tcGibbon, for respondent.
1. The instructions asked by defendant and refused, point to no
period of the life of the insured, and cover his whole lifetime.
The instructions given by the Court present to the-jury the question, as to the truth of the declarations made by the insured in
the application, and at the revival of the policy.
2. The material question was whether the assured was sober
and temperate at the time the risk was to take effect, or was revived. The jury found that issue for the plaintiff; and the instructions given covering that point, it was not error to refuse to repeat
them: Williams vs. Van Meter, 8 Mo. 339 ; Pond vs. Wyman, 15
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Mo. 175; Garrol vs. Paul,19 Mo. 102; Burst vs. Robison, 8 Mo.
82; Bu~tsman vs. Rutherfurd, 13 Mo. 465; Gamache vs. Piquinot, 17 Mo. 310; Young vs. White, 18 Mo. 93.
3. The waiver of the right to sue in any other Court than those
of the state of New York was void, as against public policy:
Story on Cont. 449; Chitty on Cont. 674.
BAY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action to recover the sum of two thousand dollars,
with interest, insured by defendant upon the lives of Frederick
Reichard and Wilhelmine his wife, for the sole use of the surviv9r.
The policy bears date July 1st, 1856, and required that the premium should be paid annually on or before the 26th of June in
every year, otherwise said policy to cease and terminate. The
policy became forfeited by the non-payment of the premium, but
was renewed on the 16th of July, 1857. Frederick Reichard died
January 27, 1858. It is provided in the policy, and declared to
be the true intent and meaning thereof, that if the declaration
made by the said Frederick and Wilhelmine, bearing date the 16th
and 18th days of June, 1856, and upon the faith of which the
agreement was made, shall be found in any respect untrue, then
and in such case said policy shall become null and void. In the
statement referred to, the insured represented that they were sober
and temperate, and in good health. It was also stipulated between
the parties, that the insured waives all right to bring an action
under said policy except in the courts of the state of New York.
The answer of defendant denies the right of plaintiff to sue in
the courts of Missouri. It sets up as a further defence, that said
Frederick Reichard was not a sober and temperate man when said
policy was issued and when the same was revived, nor was he in
good health when said policy was revived.
Upon the trial below, defendant's counsel claimed the right to
open and conclude, upon the ground that the answer set up affirmative matter to defeat the action; and the refusal of the Court to
so permit him is assigned here as error. There can be no doubt
but that the general practice in this country is to permit the party
holding the affirmative, and upon whom rests the burden of proof,
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to open and conclude the argument to the jury, but it is a mere
matter of practice resting in the discretion of the Court ;"and this
Court has held, in Wade vs. Scott, 7 Mo. 509, and in Tibeau vs.
Tibeau, 22 Mo. 77, that it will not reverse a judgment upon that
ground, unless it is manifest that such refusal has produced a
wrong to the party. In this case, we are not advised that the defendant suffered any injury by the ruling of the Court in that
respect.
The next error is that the Court refused to instruct the jury,
that if they found from the evidence, that, when application was
made for the policy of insurance, the applicants waived all right
to bring any action for any claim whatever arising under said
policy except in the courts of the state of New York, then the
plaintiff cannot recover.
We think the Court very properly refused this instruction, not
only upon the ground that the agreement to waive the right to sue
in our courts is void, as against public policy, but because it is in
direct contravention of a statute of this state passed for the government and regulation of agencies of foreign insurance companies, approved December 8, 1855. The first section of the act
requires that every person acting as an agent of an insurance coinpany not incorporated by the laws of this state, shall, before entering upon his duties, perform certain acts, among which is the
following:" He shall file with the clerk of the county court of the county
in which he proposes to do business, a resolution of the board of
directors of such company, duly authenticated by the secretary
thereof, under seal of such company, authorizing any person having
a claim against such company, growing out of a contract of insurance in this state with the agent or agents thereof, doing business
in this state, to sue such company for the same in any court of
this state having competent jurisdiction; and further authorizing
the service of process on said agent or agents, by personal service,
or by leaving a copy thereof at his last place of abode, to be
binding on said company to abide the issue of said suit, and that
such service shall authorize a judgment in such suit against such
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company in the same manner and with like effect as a judgment istaken against an individual in such court when having full jurisdiction over him."
The object of this enactment is very apparent. Prior to its
passage our courts had no control over these foreign companies,
who felt licensed to defraud our citizens out of their just dues
whenever they felt so disposed. In many instances the owners of
property insured submitted to ruinous compromises rather than
undergo the vexation, expense, and uncertainty of litigating with
a powerful corporation in the courts of a distant state. The legislature, therefore, very wisely determined that they should not do
business in this state unless under certain restrictions imposed for
the public good. The right of claiming to sue in our courts is one
of the concessions made by these companies for the privilege of
being permitted to establish agencies here. The agreement of the
parties then, in this case, is not only to divest our courts of their
jurisdiction, but to relieve the defendant of an obligation, not imposed by the insured, but by a law of the state. We are clearly
of opinion that such an agreement is null and void.
The last ground of error is the refusal of the Court to give certain instructions asked for by defendant. The Court, at the
instance of defendant, gave the following instructions:-If the jury find from the evidence that the said Frederick
Reichard was not sober and temperate when the policy sued on
was issued, they will find for the defendant.
,,If the jury find that Frederick Reichard was not of sober and
temperate habits on the 16th day of July, 1857, when said policy
was renewed, they will find for the defendant.
" If the jury find from the evidence that, at the time the policy
sued on was renewed, the said Frederick Reichard was of intemperate habits, and that this fact was not communicated by the
assured to the defendant, then the plaintiff cannot recover.
" If the jury find from the evidence, either that the said Frederick Reichard was not, at the time of issuing the policy, a temperate man, or was not a sober and temperate man when the policy
sued on was renewed, the jury will find for the defendant, unless
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they further find that said defendant had notice that said Reichard's habits were not sober and temperate at these times.
cIf the jury find from the evidence that said Reichard was not
in good health on the 16th of July, 1857, when the policy sued on
was revived, then the plaintiff cannot recover in this case."
The defendant then asked the Court to give the following instructions, which were refused:" If the jury find from the evidence that Frederick Reichard's
death was occasioned by the intemperate use of intoxicating drinks,
then the plaintiff cannot recover.
-If the jury find from the evidence that Frederick Reichard's
death was hastened by the intemperate use of intoxicating drinks,
the plaintiff cannot recover.
"If the jury find from the evidence that Frederick Reichard
died in consequence of the excessive use of intoxicating drinks,
then the plaintiff cannot recover."
The instructions refused do not, in our opinion, embody the law
of the case. They refer to no definite period of time. It is immaterial whether Reichard's death was occasioned by intemperance
or not. If he was, at the time of the issuing of the policy and
at the time of the renewal thereof, temperate and in good health,
then it cannot be said that he made false representations to the
company, without which the risk would not have been taken. The
risk was taken upon the statement made at the time of issuing the
policy, and had no reference to any future change in the habits of
the insured. If Reichard became intemperate subsequent to the
issuing and renewal of the policy, and this fact could be set up in
bar to a recovery, we see no reason why intemperance in eating,
the undue exposure of the person to the inclemency of the weather,
or any other act tending to shorten life, might not with equal propriety be pleaded in bar.
The instructions given left it to the jury to -say whether, at the
time of the issuing and renewal of the policy, Reichard was in
good health and of sober and temperate habits. It was a question of fact, and the jury having passed upon it, we see no reason
to disturb their verdict.
The other judges concurring, the judgment is affirmed.

SHOENBERGER vs. WATTS.

-District Courtfor the City and County of Philadelpia.
SHqENBERGER Vs. WATTS.
Defendants executed a bond with warrant of attorney, for $28,000, payable "in
specie, current gold and silver money of the United States," and "that no existing law or laws, and no law or laws which may be hereafter enacted, shall operate, or be construed as operating to allow payment to be made in any other
money, than that above designated ;"

,the said obligors expressly waiving the

benefit derived or to be derived from such law or laws."
Judgment was entered and fI. fa. issued, in which the sheriff was required to levy
the debt and interest "in

specie, current gold and silver money."

The Court,

on motion, set aside the fi. fa. and held: That the 5. fa. was irregular; as a final
judgment is necessarily for lawful money, and is payable in any money which
the law has made a legal tender.

The facts of the case will appear in the opinion of the Court,
which was delivered by
HARE, J.-The defendants in this case, Henry Musselman and
Henry M. Watts, executed some years ago a bond to the plaintiff,
conditioned for the payment of twenty-eight thousand dollars, not
as such instruments are usually worded, in lawful money, or lawful money of the United States, but "in specie, current gold and
silver money of the United States."
This peculiarity in the wording of the condition, which was,
when written, mere tautology or surplusage, as being a needless
expression of that which the law would have implied if it had not
been expressly stipulated, has since acquired significance, and
become a stipulation for that which the law no longer implies, and
perhaps will not enforce or sanction. For, by the passage of a
recent and well known Act of Congress, Treasury notes of the
United States have been raised to an equality as money with gold
and silver, and declared to be a legal tender for the payment of
all debts. The constitutionality and binding force of this act are
not denied by the plaintiff, who has expressly waived bringing
them in question, but he insists that it is not applicable to a
contract, which, like the present, provides expressly, that the
payment shall be made in gold or silver, and thus impliedly
negatives the right to pay in paper. He has accordingly entered
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judgment on the warrant of attorney accompanying the bond and
reciting its condition, and issued an execution by which the
sheriff ig required to levy twenty-eight thousand one hundred and
fifteen dollars out of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements
of the defendants, not as such writs ordinarily run, in lawful
money of Pennsylvania, but "in specie, current gold and silver
money," in the words of the condition of the bond. This writ the
defendants ask to set aside as without warrant, unusual and
illegal; and we have consequently to determine first, whether the
special agreement on which the plaintiff relies is legal, and one
for which the law will give a remedy; and next, if it be so,
whether the summary remedy which the plaintiff has chosen has
been chosen rightly, and is well founded in point of law.
The familiar maxim, quilibet potest renunciarejuripro se introducto, implies what we know from other sources, that men are in
general free to contract as they think proper, and may, ordinarily
speaking, make any bargain, which suits their pleasure, the law
not caring, and indeed not being able to ascertain whether what
has been agreed on between persons who are sui juris, and not
destitute of ordinary capacity, is wise or foolish, beneficial to
both, or advantageous to neither of the contracting parties. When,
however, a contract is contrary to law, and attempts to do or
regulate in one way, that which the legislature has declared shall
be done in another, the law may, and often will pronounce the
contract void, especially if the matter be one in which the whole
community has an interest, and which does not exclusively concern the individuals who have made the contract. A debtor may
renounce the protection of the statute of limitations after it has
taken effect in his favor, and barred the debt, but he cannot do
so in the first place in making the contract in which the debt
originates. No covenant, in or at the time of executing a mortgage, can be so binding as to preclude the mortgagor from
redeeming the mortgaged premises, or even limit the time within
which the right may be exercised, although his control over it is
for all other purposes absolute, and he may, if he pleases, cede it
to, a stranger for nothing. Examples might be multiplied, but
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these are sufficient to show the necessity for drawing the line
between what may and what may not be renounced lawfully, and
the difficulty of drawing it correctly. There is nothing in which
the public at large have a greater interest than in the currency,
which is to the social system what the circulation of the blood is
in the natural body, which brings to the laborer the reward of
toil, to the merchant the returns of commerce, to the agriculturist
facilities for exchanging his productions, which is literally and
without overstatement, the means of luxury, of comfort and of
daily bread to each and all in their several stations. It feeds and
supplies the community in peace, it arms and maintains the
soldier, who is the defence of the state in war; it is next to light
and air, and beyond all secondary and artificial agents, the most
general, the most pervading and powerful influence, and that on
which most depends. Its uniformity, its stability, its security,
and still more, the confidence felt in its security, are in their turn
the springs on which it rests, and by which alone it can perform
its vast and delicate functions. Hence, the power of saying what
shall be money, at what rate money shall be taken, and what it
shall be worth, has, in all civilized countries, and almost from the
outset of civilization, been deemed one of the badges and attributes of sovereignty, and assigned to the central and supreme
authority of the state, as that which may indeed be perverted or
abused, but which, yet abused or not, must be exercised uniformly,
and according to some common rule, in order to be of utility at
all. This being the object and design for-which the coining and
money-making power was given to the government of the United
States in common with all other governments, we may well doubt
whether, when that government has exercised its high prerogative,
by deciding that certain modes or forms of value shall all be
money, and all be money equally, that the same nominal quantities of each shall be worth as much as any of the others, it can
be competent for the citizen to discriminate in a matter where
the law of the land has refused to distinguish, to make a bargain
excluding those with whom he contracts from a means of payment
which the law has decided shall be open to, and available for all,
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and incumber them with a debt of a*new and special nature, no
capable of being discharged in the way in which ordinary debts
are by law payable. Congress, in the exercise of its supreme
authority, declares that gold, silver and Treasury notes shall be
legal tender for the payment of all debts, that a debtor who
comes with these; or any of them in his hand, and proffers them
to his creditor, shall be freed from all further obligation, that all
liability on his part either in person or property shall forthwith
cease. Not so, says the creditor; by the magic of a fe* words in
this paper, I will create a debt and impose an obligation, to which
the enabling and beneficial provisions of the statute shall not be
applicable, which gold, which silver or which government paper
shall not be capable of extinguishing, which must be paid in a
particular way of my own choosing, that will, as I think, be more
beneficial to me, whatever may be its effect in depriving my debtor
of the right of choice given him by Congress. Surely, this is to
run counter, not only to the spirit, but to the very letter of an
act which applies in terms to all debts, without excepting any, or
in any way providing or implying that there may or can be a
right to create debts to which it shall not apply.
These considerations certainly have much weight, and may well
induce a doubt, whether a contract, by which a debt must be paid
only in one form or mode to the exclusion of others, which, in the
eye of law, are of equal validity, and in which it has declared,
that all debts shall be payable, is consistent with public policy, or
legally good and valid. But there is another line of argument
tending nearly, if not directly to the same result, and which may
be regarded as a corroboration of that pursued above. If an
agreement for payment in gold and not in silver, or in silver and
not in gold or Treasury notes, be legally binding, it is still but an
agreement, which will not be specifically enforced if broken, or
admit of any other remedy than an award of damages as compensation for the breach. If, for instance, the stipulation is for gold,
and silver only is tendered, or for silver and the tender be in
paper, the compensation due, the damages adjudged, will depend
on the difference between what was due and what was offered, or
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between gold and silver in the one case, and gold and paper in
the other. But by the Constitution of the United States, Congress has power "to coin money and regulate the value thereof,"
and has exercised that power by declaring, that a hundred pieces
of silver of a certain weight and fineness shall be of the same
value as a hundred pieces of gold of a certain other weight and
fineness, or in other words, that a hundred dollars shall be worth
a hundred dollars and no more, whether tendered in silver or in
gold. Whenever, therefore, it shall become the province of a
court and jury to ascertain the compensation due to a man who
has bargained for gold and had silver offered to him, or has bargained for silver and been met with a tender of gold, it will probably be the duty of the court to instruct the jury that there is
no damage, or that the damage is but nominal; that what was
proffered under the contract was legally equivalent to that which
the contract called for; that the party plaintiff is not, in contemplation of law, injured, and is simply entitled to a verdict for the
amount of the debt without costs or interest. It is true, that a
visit to a board of brokers or other place of business, where coin
is bought and sold as merchandise, might lead to a different result,
and show at one time, that a hundred dollars in silver is far from
having the same value as a hundred dollars in gold, and at another,
that a hundred dollars in gold is less valuable than a hundred
dollars in silver. But there are many cases ' in which the legal
measure of damagqs is different from the real, and where the law
stops short of compensation for the full amount of the injury for
reasons which need not be detailed here, but which would recommend themselves to all if there were time to state them. This is
especially true where money is in question, and where the wrong
consists in the breach of an agreement for the payment of money,
as distinguished from one for the delivery of things of any other
description. A merchant's credit and fortune may have been
ruined, the most favorable opportunity for speculation may have
been lost, the most profitable bargain or enterprise abandoned in
consequence of the impunctuality of a debtor, and yet the creditor
will be confined to a recovery of the debt with six per cent. interest
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during the time that payment has been delayed, and proof that
the compensation thus given is insufficient and falls far short of
the real loss, rejected as wholly immaterial in point of law. Even,
therefore, if a stipulation that what the law declares a legal tender
shall not be so, or that a debt shall be payable in one kind of
legal currency to the exclusion of others, is not to be set aside
summarily as contrary to public policy, it must still, as it would
seem, fail of effect, when brought to the test of an attempt to
enforce it by a suit for damages.
I am, however, reminded by counsel, that the bond on which
the plaintiff seeks to recover in this instance, besides stipulating
for payment in gold and silver money of the United States, also
stipulates "that no existing law or laws, and no law or laws which
may be hereafter enacted, shall operate, or be construed as operating to allow payment to be made in any other money, than that
above designated;" "the said obligors expressly waiving the
benefit derived, or to be derived from such law or laws ;" and
these clauses are said to be at all events binding, and to entitle
the plaintiff to insist on the terms of the bond, whatever might
have been the rule if they had not been introduced. But, with
every disposition to give weight to this argument, which was carefully considered by the Court in consultation, I am unable to see
that it varies the case, or renders anything that has been said
hitherto inapplicable. If the subject-matter of this contract is
such that it may be dealt with freely at the pleasure of the parties,
irrespectively of the words of the statute, then their express
agreement that the bond should be paid "in specie," should have
that effect given to it which they must be presumed to have intended, and the debt be treated as one which gold and silver can
alone satisfy. But if, on the other hand, as I have endeavored to
show, and think most probable, the matter is one which the law
reserves exclusively for its own action, and will not suffer to be
touched by any private or inferior hand, then a stipulation that
it shall not be regulated by the law, must, necessarily, be void and
inoperative. It is obvious that parties cannot nullify the provisions of a statute, by anticipation, on any point where they
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would necessarily be bound by them, if the statute had been
passed; and that the question whether a contract is contrary to
law, is to be solved by looking at the law and the contract, and
seeing whether the one contravenes or is opposed to the letter and
spirit of the other, and not merely by considering whether the
law was made before the contract, or the contract before the law.
The State Legislatures are, indeed, by the Constitution of the
United States, prohibited from impairing the obligations of contracts, but there is no such restraint on the National Legislature,
and when the power of Congress is exercised retrospectively as it
ordinarily is, and in the nature of things generally must be in
legislating with reference to the currency, and declaring what
shall be money and what money shall be worth, it will apply as
effectually to past debts as to those which are subsequently contracted, notwithstanding anything which may be said to the contrary in the agreement in which the debt has its origin.'
It is, however, unnecessary to express a final opinion on these
points, which concern the plaintiff's right under the contract,
because it is clear that even if he has the right which he claims,
he has mistaken the remedy, and must resort to a longer and less
direct path than that which he is endeavoring to pursue. If a
bond were conditioned for the payment of a certain number of
bushels of wheat, or for a specific amount of foreign coin, every
one would admit that the entry of judgment on a warrant, of
attorney accompanying the bond, would not justify the issuing of
an execution addressed to the sheriff, and commanding him to sell
the goods and chattels of the defendants for, and payable only in
the wheat or coin which he had promised to give, and which he
was in default for not giving, because the proper redress would lie
in a scirefacias or other proceeding on the judgment, of a nature
to bring the injury inflicted by the breach before a court and jury,
and enable them to ascertain its exact nature, and what amount
of damages should be awarded by way of compensation. And it
would seem very plain that the same course must be pursued when
the condition is for the payment of a particular sort of domestic
currency, to the exclusion of every other. If the breach of a con-
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dition to pay in gold and not in silver, or in silver and not in
treasury notes, be an injury in the sense in which injury implies
a violation of legal right, as distinguished from the infliction of
loss or damage without legal wrong, still the amount of the
injury is obviously a question of fact depending on the state
of the market for bullion when the default occurs, and requiring the introduction of evidence on one side, or on both, for
its proper adjustment. Like other questions of the same sort, it
should therefore be tried by a jury, and solved by their verdict,
guided by the charge of a court. But the plaintiff, instead of
pursuing this course, has entered a judgment on the bond, which
he has treated as final, and not interlocutory,.by proceeding at
once to execution. Now, a final judgment in debt, covenant, or
assumpsit, or indeed in any proceeding instituted for the recovery
of money or damages, is necessarily a judgment for so much lawful money, payable in any money which the law esteems lawful,
and has made a legal tender when other payments are in question.
Whatever the contract may have been, when. once pushed to a
recovery it can have but one termination, and end in a judgment,
not for what was contracted for, but for an equivalent for the
breach of the contract in current coin' There may, indeed, sometimes in replevin or detinue, be a recovery of a specific thing, but
never in actions founded on contract, nor in any action for things
generally of a specific kind or class; the reason being that every
judgment must be final, and furnish an exact measure of what one
party is to give and the other to get.
Equity may, no doubt, make a decree, and issue a writ to
compel the performance of a contract, specifically and in terms;
but then the jurisdiction of equity is discretionary and special,
controlled by circumstances, and exercised with reference not only
to the strict legal right of the plaintiff, but to what the defendant
may in each instance be reasonably required to do, and has it in
his power to accomplish. And besides, equity confines this sort
of redress ordinarily, if not exclusively, to contracts for the conveyance of land, and will seldom, if ever; compel the fulfilment of
an agreement for the sale and delivery of chattels. The writ
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which has been issued in this instance, is in effect a decree of
specific performance, requiring the defendants to fulfil their contract to the letter, and directing the sheriff, in the event of their
default, to fulfil it for them, by converting their lands and goods
not into money generally, but into the particular kind of money
which they contracted to furnish. Such an order seems to me
essentially contrary to the spirit in which equity, proceeds in
enforcing contracts, and would ble as little likely to receive the
sanction of a chancellor, as of the judges of a Court of common
law.
It has, however, been suggested, that although the plaintiff
could not, on a bond or covenant for payment in Spanish dollars,
with a warrant of attorney, enter judgment and issue execution
for Spanish dollars, there is no reason why lie should not have a
judgment and execution for silver American dollars, as distinguished from gold, or payable only in gold dollars, and not in
paper. One, and to a legal mind, sufficient answer to this is, that
such a judgment would be without a parallel or precedent, and
contrary alike to the forms and spirit of the law, which always
seeks to pass from the particular to the general, and may well be
averse to giving force and perpetuity to a special obligation, that
may, in the course of time and events, become difficult to execute,
if not of impossible execution. The ordinary, wise, and invariable
course therefore is, and has been, to refer the injury inflicted by
a breach of contract, to the period when the contract was broken,
to examine what the injured party would have got, if the contract
had been then fulfilled, and what he lost by its non-fulfilment, to
estimate this in the currency of the commonwealth, and enter
judgment for the amount as thus ascertained; a judgment not in
the terms'of the contract, while it drowns or merges, and having
nothing in common with it, except that of being an equivalent in
the general and common measure of all value, for the particular
form of value stipulated for in the contract. A contract may be
for the delivery of grain, but the judgment on it is not on that
account for grain, but for as much money as the grain, if delivered,
would have been worth at the time and place of delivery. A judgVOL. 10.-35

